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Suspension for Beginners:
Ex Parte Bollman and the Unconstitutionality
of the 1996 Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act
by DAN POULSON*
I. Introduction
The writ of habeas corpus (Latin for "you have the body") refers to a
proceeding in which a court inquires into the legal sufficiency of an
individual's imprisonment by ordering the responsible official to bring the
prisoner before the court and justify the confinement.1  If the court
determines that there is no legal basis for the confinement, the prisoner is
set free. Since its creation in the thirteenth century, the writ has come to
occupy a cherished, singular role in Anglo-American jurisprudence as a
safeguard against government oppression.
2
Today, the federal habeas forum is most often invoked as a form of
post-conviction review that occurs after the inmate has been denied all
other forms of relief.3  For a state inmate, this requires exhausting state
judicial remedies either on direct appeal or through state post-conviction
proceedings by presenting the state's highest court with a fair opportunity
to rule on the merits of every claim they seek to raise in federal court.4 A
state prisoner who satisfies this criterion may file a petition for habeas
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., Political
Science, B.A., English, 2004, Brown University.
1. The proper term for this proceeding is habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. At the time of
this country's founding, the term habeas corpus actually referred to a number of writs, each of
which were issued by the courts, commanding that an official appear before the court with the
named individual. See Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95-98 (1807).
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254(b) (2006).
4. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16
(1982).
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review in a federal district court, which is then required to decide whether
the prisoner is being held in custody "in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."5 The federal habeas forum is almost
always the court of last resort and is typically the last legal proceeding
guaranteed to capital inmates before they are executed. It is fitting, then,
that habeas is also the only common law writ directly mentioned in the
Constitution. The Suspension Clause provides that "[t]he privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 6
Chief Justice John Marshall's 1807 opinion in Ex parte Bollman7 gave
the Suspension Clause an extremely narrow construction that has not been
seriously challenged by the Court since. Even though the Suspension
Clause seems to presume that federal courts have the inherent power to
grant habeas relief, Bollman held that such authority had to be vested in
federal courts by Congress. 8 Bollman narrowed the writ's scope even
further by holding that the Suspension Clause's protection only extended to
federal, rather than state, prisoners. 9
Since Bollman, there have been substantial changes in the landscape
of federal habeas law. Most importantly, Congress eventually expanded
federal habeas jurisdiction to include challenges brought by state prisoners.
Nonetheless, it remains accepted wisdom today-200 years after
Bollman-that the Suspension Clause does not meaningfully constrain
Congress's considerable latitude in defining the boundaries of federal
habeas review. Indeed, the most recent revision to the federal habeas
statute, the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), 10 dramatically limited the availability of review for state
prisoners, effectively denying relief for all but the most egregious
constitutional errors committed by state courts. Today, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), federal courts are prohibited from granting habeas relief to
state prisoners with regard to any claim that has been adjudicated on the
merits by a state court unless the adjudication "resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States."
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
7. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
8. Id. at 99.
9. Id.
10. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267).
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Over the past eleven years, this language has come under attack as an
unconstitutional limitation on the decision-making powers of federal
courts. In particular, critics contend that § 2254(d)(1) violates Separation
of Powers principles articulated in Marbury v. Madison,1' United States v.
Klein,'2 and City of Boerne v. Flores.13 This argument has essentially two
components, the first being that § 2254(d)(1) imposes substantive
restrictions on federal courts that prohibit them from exercising their
Article III judicial power14 to independently review questions of, and give
effect to, matters relating to the Constitution.15 In other words, because
§ 2254(d)(1) compels the judicial branch to leave intact erroneous but not
"objectively unreasonable" state court constitutional decisions, the federal
courts are no longer freely empowered to "say what the law is."'16 Second,
because § 2254(d)(1) forces federal courts to depend solely on "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States," the statute unconstitutionally prescribes the sources of law that
federal courts must use in exercising habeas jurisdiction. 7 According to
this logic, if a federal habeas court cannot rely on its own precedent to
elucidate a principle of federal law in the absence of controlling Supreme
Court authority, these prior rulings are stripped of their binding
precedential effect.
As credible as these arguments are, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to address the murky constitutional status of § 2254(d)(1), and
some circuit courts have construed this silence as implicit approval of
AEDPA's substantive restrictions.' 8  Those circuits that have explicitly
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
13. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required ofArticle III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998).
16. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 147.
17. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Habeas Corpus Resource Center et al. in Support of
Petitioner at 16-20; Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15275); Evan Tsen Lee,
Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV.
103 (1998); Joseph M. Brummer, Comment, Negating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending
Stare Decisis: AEDPA and Problems for the Article III Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 307
(2006).
18. See, e.g., Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1129 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We consider the
Court's longstanding application of the rules set forth in AEDPA to be strong evidence of the
Act's constitutionality."); Duhaime v. DuCharme, 200 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he
Supreme Court... has refused to reverse decisions from other circuits on the ground that
upholding § 2254(d)(1) would unconstitutionally prohibit Article III courts from determining how
they should function and from executing their responsibilities.").
Winter 20081 SUSPENSION FOR BEGINNERS
confronted the constitutionality of § 2254(d)(1) have carefully
distinguished its provisions from the federal laws invalidated in Klein,
Marbury, and Boerne.19 There are still hints of dissatisfaction among some
circuit court judges (judges on the Ninth Circuit in particular) who believe
Congress overstepped its boundaries by so radically altering the terms of
habeas relief, but for the most part constitutional critiques of § 2254(d)(1)
have been limited to a handful of concurrences and dissents.20  Any
questions about the constitutional status of this provision would seem to be
long-settled.
Then again, past constitutional challenges to § 2254(d)(1) have not
seriously grappled with the Suspension Clause and its implications,
focusing instead on Article III and Marbury. Perhaps this strategy is
misguided.
Bollman may have given Congress considerable discretion over the
regulation of the judiciary's jurisdiction in habeas actions, but it by no
means implied that Congress had unilateral power to define the
circumstances in which habeas relief could be granted. On the contrary,
Bollman noted in forceful terms that while the jurisdictional boundaries of
the writ were subject to congressional approval, the actual meaning of the
writ-the procedural and doctrinal scope of the rights vindicated under it-
was left in the hands of the judiciary.2' While Bollman did not explicitly
say so, this distinction is a natural extension of the Suspension Clause,
which can be read as an exhaustive, rather than illustrative, elaboration on
Congress's power with regard to the writ. While Congress is free to
suspend the writ in times of rebellion or national emergency, nothing in the
Suspension Clause contemplates Congress's powers as encompassing the
19. See, e.g., Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 601; Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 874-75 (4th Cir.
1998) ("[S]ection 2254(d) does not limit any inferior federal court's independent interpretive
authority to determine the meaning of federal law in an Article III case or controversy."); Lindh
v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869-72 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Regulating relief is a far cry from
limiting the interpretive power of the courts ... and Congress has ample power to adjust the
circumstances under which the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is deployed."), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
20. See., e.g., Irons, 479 F.3d at 667 (Noonan, J., concurring) ("AEDPA does not address
jurisdiction: it addresses the materials for judging. It deprives a whole class of cases of their
normal value as governing authority for the circuit which has decided them."); Davis v. Straub,
430 F.3d 281, 291-99 (6th Cir. 2005) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority's
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) "unconstitutionally obstructs Article Ill's mandate to
exercise the judicial power in cases over which the court properly has jurisdiction"); Gibbs v.
Frank, 387 F.3d 268, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (Nygaard, J., concurring) ("[T]o the extent AEDPA was
actually intended by Congress to deny access by habeas petitioners to the protections of the Bill
of Rights subject to a condition precedent, in my view this preclusion should be considered a
suspension of the writ.").
21. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807).
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right to dictate the writ's substantive meaning. Indeed, such power, when
taken to its logical endpoint, would render the writ-and the Suspension
Clause-an empty, formalistic gesture.
Part I of this Note will discuss the relevance of Bollman and its key
holdings. Part II will discuss the evolution of the modem habeas standard
of review, and how it was altered under AEDPA. Part III will examine the
dominant constitutional critiques of § 2254(d)(1). Finally, Part IV will
explain the significance of the Suspension Clause as a constraint on the
powers of Congress to redefine the terms of habeas relief.
II. Habeas and the Suspension Clause Under Bollman
There is a certain degree of tension between the Suspension Clause,
which seems to assume the writ's existence at common law, and the
notable absence of any reference to the common law in Article III's
description of the federal courts' judicial power.22 Bollman, the first case
to expressly define the contours of federal habeas, held that the Suspension
Clause does not expressly endow federal courts with the inherent power to
grant the writ, and, in the absence of such power, Congress must make an
affirmative grant of jurisdiction. 23 "To enable the court to decide on such
question," Marshall wrote, "the power to determine it must [be] given by
written law."24 In other words, because federal courts derive their power
directly from the text of Article III, or by an Act of Congress authorized
under Article 111,25 the power of a federal court to grant the writ must be
traced to one of those two sources.
The implications of this argument were quite radical: Bollman is
regarded as essentially severing federal habeas corpus from the body of
common law and the historical understanding that had nurtured its usage in
Great Britain and the colonies. After Bollman, the argument goes, the writ
became something strange and new: a creature of statutory law. By
Bollman's logic, Congress could even "suspend" the writ simply by doing
nothing at all.26
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93-94. The controversy around this holding has not dimmed over
time: former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was lambasted for making similar claims
during his Jan. 24, 2007 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the recently
enacted interrogation and trial law, which denies federal habeas relief for suspected terrorists held
under executive detention. Bob Egelko, Gonzales Says the Constitution Doesn't Guarantee
Habeas Corpus, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 2007, at Al.
24. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 94.
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803).
26. See Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95 ("[The first Congress] must have felt.., the obligation of
providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and
Winter 2008]
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But even as Bollman empowered Congress with the statutory authority
to withdraw habeas jurisdiction, it drew a subtle distinction between that
power and the power of the courts to define the scope of the writ. "[T]he
meaning of the term habeas corpus," Marshall wrote, may be defined by
"resort... to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of
the courts of the United States, must be given by written law.",27 This deft
rhetorical maneuver affirmed the legislative branch's control over the
courts' jurisdictional reach, but freed from congressional interference the
courts' power to decide questions that arose under that jurisdiction.
Marshall stressed that "[t]his opinion is not to be considered as abridging
the power of courts ... to protect themselves.., from being disturbed in
the exercise of their functions. It extends only to the power of taking
cognizance of any question between individuals, or between the
government and individuals. 28
The holding in Bollman thus strongly recalls Marshall's elegant work
four years prior in Marbury. Marbury conceded Congress's Article III
jurisdictional powers, but it also read the Constitution as endowing the
Judicial Department with the power to invalidate federal laws that, in its
independent judgment, violated the Constitution (which in the context of
Marbury conveniently allowed the Court to avoid deciding the merits of a
politically toxic case).29 Similarly, even as Bollman gestures to the
omnipotence of Congress to confer jurisdiction in habeas corpus actions,
the opinion extols the power of the courts to breathe life and force into the
writ. 30  Under Bollman, as in Marbury, the jurisdictional grant to hear a
habeas case may originate with Congress, but it is the domain of the
judiciary to shape its meaning.
activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law
for its suspension should be enacted."). In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court distanced itself from this
argument and hinted that it found Marshall's reasoning unsound, construing Bollman as holding
that the Clause was "intended to preclude any possibility that 'the privilege itself would be lost'
by either the inaction or the action of Congress." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001)
(quoting Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No.. 109-13, 119
Stat. 231, 302 (2005). In Professor Freedman's opinion, this interpretative feat was accomplished
only by "truncating the relevant passages of Bollman." ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:
RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 4 (2001).
27. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93-94 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
29. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137.
30. The facts of Bollman, and its ultimate resolution illustrate this dramatically: Samuel
Swartwout and Erick Bollman had been committed without trial by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals on charges of treason for aiding Aaron Burr's failed revolutionary campaign. After
Marshall determined that the Court had the power to issue the writ, the Court examined the merits
of the petition and ruled that the evidence against the petitioners was insufficient to support an
indictment for treason, and the prisoners were discharged. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 114-37.
[Vol. 35:2
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But while Marbury is arguably the most revered case in Supreme
Court history, Bollman has suffered withering criticism. Professor Eric M.
Freedman has found documentary support for the notion that the Framers,
notwithstanding Bollman's contention otherwise, actually did intend the
Suspension Clause to confer habeas power to Article III courts, even in the
absence of any congressional action.3' Freedman argues that the Framers'
unanimous agreement of the writ's importance as a safeguard against
government overreaching expressly contradicts Bollman's reasoning that
the writ was subject to jurisdictional authorization by Congress.32
Moreover, the Framers modeled the Suspension Clause after the texts of
various state constitutions, all of which functioned to preserve habeas as a
pre-existing right conferred on the courts at common law. 33 Certainly, the
Suspension Clause when read most naturally suggests this interpretation: to
say that something cannot be suspended assumes that there is already
something to suspend. Nor was there any precedential support at the time
for Marshall's assertion in Bollman that courts established by written law
are restricted to exercising only those powers given to them by that law.
34
However, criticisms of Bollman's reasoning remain largely academic.
That is because, for as long as Article III courts have been in existence,
they have always been empowered with a statutory grant of habeas
jurisdiction. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave Article III courts
the power to issue the writ for all persons seeking review of federal court
judgments, "for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment." 35
Bollman upheld the constitutionality of section 14, but in order to do so it
treated habeas as an appellate, rather than an original, proceeding.36 The
reason for this is simple: while Congress has the power to establish the
original jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, Marbury held that
Congress was strictly circumscribed from modifying the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction.37  In the context of Bollman, this was especially
31. FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 26.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 26, 164 n.46 (citing Milton Cantor, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: Early American
Origins and Development, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 55, 75 (Harold M. Hyman & Leonard W.
Levy eds., 1967)).
34. Id. at 25, 164 n.41.
35. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
36. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) ("The decision that the individual
shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ
must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature.").
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("If congress remains at liberty
to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall
Winter 2008]
problematic, since the habeas petition in that case had not first passed
through a lower federal court. Indeed, while habeas corpus in its modem
form is typically a form of collateral post-conviction relief, in the
nineteenth century the writ was almost always a pre-conviction procedure,
available only to individuals who were confined without trial or bail, but
unavailable to those who had been convicted by a federal court of proper
jurisdiction, even one whose judgment was in error.38 Thus, Marshall's
statement that habeas was "clearly appellate" 39 seems a bit disingenuous,
since the writ, in contrast with appellate procedure, was usually unavailable
to review convictions issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. 40 But in
order for Marshall to uphold the federal courts' power to review habeas
actions, the grant of jurisdiction had to be labeled appellate.
Bollman's reading of section 14 was also notable in that it interpreted
the Judiciary Act as withholding federal habeas jurisdiction for state
inmates.41 In dicta, Marshall suggested that this limitation did not violate
the Suspension Clause because it only protected the writ for persons under
federal custody.42 Whether or not this interpretation of the Suspension
Clause was legally correct,4 3 it has been mooted by three developments.
First, in 1867, Congress amended the federal statute to extend habeas
protection to state inmates.44 Second, the Court has come to interpret the
Suspension Clause as applying to the modem form of the writ, rather than
any of its historical antecedents.45 Third, the Court's 1960s habeas
jurisprudence suggests that the Suspension Clause might be applicable
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.46 In other words, if Congress were to suspend habeas jurisdiction
be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the
distribution ofjurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.").
38. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-09 (1830) (holding that the writ shall be
denied where inmate is detained in prison by virtue of the judgment of a court that possesses
general and final jurisdiction in criminal cases).
39. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 101.
40. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 202-09.
41. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 99.
42. Id.
43. See FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 3.
44. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
45. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) ("[A]t the absolute minimum, the
Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789."') (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 663-64 (1996)); Felker, 518 U.S. at 663-64 ("[W]e assume, for purposes of decision here,
that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it
existed in 1789.").
46. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963) (noting "intimations of support" for the
proposition that congressional refusal to accord the writ its full common-law scope might
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35:2
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for state prisoners in all federal courts,47 it would undoubtedly run afoul of
the Suspension Clause's edict, regardless of whether state prisoners had
access to the writ in 1789.
48
But while the jurisdictional power of federal courts to hear habeas
petitions by state prisoners has remained more or less unaltered, the
"qualitative" aspects of the writ-the rights that can be vindicated through
the writ and the standard of review federal courts apply-have been much
more volatile, having expanded and contracted dramatically over the course
of the twentieth century.
III. Scope of Rights and Standard of Review Before and After
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
The first major developments in the rights available through habeas
came after the 1867 Amendments. These amendments empowered federal
courts with habeas jurisdiction over all persons-state and federal-who
presented claims under federal law.49  Even then, post-conviction relief
through habeas was largely limited to challenges regarding the subject
matter and territorial jurisdiction of the court that had entered the
constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the writ); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238
(1963) (noting that federal habeas statute extending jurisdiction to state prisoners "implements the
constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made available"). See generally Jordan
Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862 (1994).
47. In 1868, Congress withdrew the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases
filed under the 1867 Act, only to reinstate it again in 1885. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat.
44 (1868), repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437 (1885); see Exparte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
48. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that Military
Commissions Act of 2006, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), which eliminated jurisdiction in
federal courts over habeas petitions filed by alien enemy combatants held by the United States in
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, did not violate the Suspension Clause because the Clause's
protections extend only to the writ as it existed in 1789, and in 1789 habeas review was
unavailable to aliens held in overseas military bases), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. Jun.
29, 2007) (No. 06-1196). It should be noted that the D.C. Circuit's conclusions were derived
from an abbreviated passage in St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 303. As the dissent pointed out, St. Cyr only
suggested that the Suspension Clause, at the absolute minimum, protected the writ as it existed in
1789. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1000 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Moreover, Felker, 518 U.S. at
663-64, upon which St. Cyr relied, proceeded under the opposite assumption-that the
Suspension Clause protected the modem form of the writ. Deliberate or not, by misreading St.
Cyr and assuming that the Suspension Clause does not protect the modem form of the writ, the
D.C. Circuit was able to avoid the more complicated question of whether modem habeas relief is
available to enemy combatants.
49. Act of Feb. 5, 1867.
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judgment.50 But eventually the Court began to recognize circumstances
where the state court had "voided" its jurisdiction through constitutional
error.5' State prisoners were disadvantaged in two respects, however. The
first was that prisoners held under state custody had very few constitutional
rights because the Bill of Rights was not thought to apply to the states.
Second and most important, even where a constitutional error had been
committed, the exhaustion of appellate remedies doctrine established under
Ex parte Royall denied federal habeas relief for prisoners who had not first
exhausted all other forms of relief.52 For state prisoners, this meant they
had to first seek state trial, appellate, and post-conviction relief for their
federal claims. 53  As Justice O'Connor would later explain in her
concurring opinion in Wright v. West, the exhaustion doctrine precluded
most constitutional claims for state prisoners seeking federal habeas
review, because, with very few exceptions, Due Process-essentially the
only federal right available to state inmates-was considered satisfied if the
state prisoner had been granted a "full and fair hearing" in the state
courts.54 While state inmates were entitled to seek writs of error in federal
courts on direct appeal, they were mostly shut out from seeking relief under
federal habeas.
Yet another barrier to habeas relief from state convictions was the fact
that, while state court determinations of federal law were subject to review
de novo, state court findings of fact were subject to little or no review.
Crucially, the Court applied an extremely broad definition of what qualified
as "factual determinations," including determinations that today would be
treated as mixed questions of law and fact.55 In time, the Court began to
50. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1891); Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202
(1830).
51. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (granting the writ where federal
prosecutor charged petitioner under an information rather than a grand jury indictment, as
required under the Fifth Amendment in all capital and otherwise infamous crimes); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (holding that convictions under unconstitutional laws were
jurisdictionally void and subject to habeas relief); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)
(granting writ to cure double jeopardy violation).
52. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) ("The [statute's] injunction to hear the case
summarily and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require' does not deprive the
court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it.")
(quoting Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867)).
53. Id.
54. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 297-98 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citing Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922)); Ponzi, 258 U.S. at 260 ("One accused of
crime has a right to a full and fair trial according to the law of the government whose sovereignty
he is alleged to have offended, but he has no more than that.").
55. 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2.4d, at 61 (2003).
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subject certain "factual" findings to review de novo such as when a factual
finding unsupported by the record led to the deprivation of a federal right,
or when it was necessary to re-examine a factual finding because it was so
"intermingled" with the federal right at issue.56
Moreover, as Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment became
more robust and the Court's incorporation doctrine made the Bill of Rights
applicable against the states, the category of constitutional claims available
to state inmates gradually expanded.57 Starting in the 1940s, a federal court
could grant a petition challenging a state conviction regardless whether
such violations had the effect of voiding the jurisdiction of the state
sentencing court.58 In 1948, Congress codified these principles in the
modem habeas statute, which affirmed that federal habeas courts had to
consider all constitutional claims, and eliminated any restrictions on the
standard of review applied to factual and legal claims.59 The new habeas
statute also recognized that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine for state
prisoners could be waived if there had been "an absence of available State
corrective process" or "circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner."
60
By the time of the watershed case Brown v. Allen61 in 1953, it was an
established rule that federal habeas courts were no longer bound by the
prior state courts' adjudications on questions of law and mixed questions of
law and fact, even if the petitioner had been given a full and fair hearing on
those claims.62 Brown also declared with certainty that state prisoners were
entitled to at least one meaningful review of their federal constitutional
claims in an Article III court, either through federal habeas or through
direct review on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.63 In sum, by the
56. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 593 (1915).
57. Wright, 505 U.S. at 300-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
59. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 2241-2255, 62 Stat. 869, 964-68 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2006)).
60. Id.
61. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456-58 (1953) (Reed, J., majority opinion).
62. Id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). With regard to mixed questions of fact and
law Justice Frankfurter stated:
Although there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State
consideration of such issues, no binding weight is to be attached to the State
determination. The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair
consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a
federal constitutional right.
Id.
63. This can be inferred from the central holding of Brown, which is that the denial of
certiorari by the Supreme Court "imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case."
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second half of the twentieth century, both the category of rights available
under federal habeas and the scope of review that federal courts applied
were dramatically enlarged from where they had stood less than a hundred
years earlier: a state prisoner was entitled to de novo review of all
constitutional claims,64 independent of how those claims were treated in the
prior state proceedings. That is more or less how things stood until 1996.65
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act66 was passed in the
wake of the capture and arrest of Timothy McVeigh, the lead perpetrator in
the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.67 The
Act's habeas reforms synthesized and consolidated various proposals that
had been circulating within Congress as far back as the Reagan
Administration, 68 all of which were designed to streamline federal habeas
review for state criminal convictions. 69  This package of reforms, now
named the "Effective Death Penalty Act," was then awkwardly attached to
a pending "Antiterrorism Bill" supported by President Clinton that was
designed to ensure that McVeigh received the death penalty.v Ironically,
the habeas revisions would not have had any meaningful impact on
McVeigh's chances for post-conviction relief, since he was tried in federal
rather than state court, and the bulk of the AEDPA's provisions concern
state prisoners.71
Id. at 456 (majority opinion). Therefore, no res judicata or precedential effect follows when a
habeas petitioner raises constitutional claims that were denied review by the Supreme Court on
direct review. 1d.
64. The Supreme Court removed from the purview of federal habeas all challenges resting
on the Fourth Amendment where there was a full and fair opportunity to raise them in the state
court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
65. A series of 1960s cases introduced a number of procedural innovations, but these cases
were systematically overturned over the next thirty years. See infra note 77.
66. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267 (2006)).
67. James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"? AEDPA and Error Detection in
Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411,413 (2001).
68. See CHARLES DOYLE, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW 10 n.37
(2006) (citing legislative bills); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute,
44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 426-35 (1996) (discussing the legislative history behind AEDPA).
69. See, e.g., The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1982). The essential goal of this and other
Reagan-era habeas reforms was to strip the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction in matters where
the prisoner had received a "full and fair" hearing on the merits of their federal claims, even if the
state court judgment had been in error. Under this "procedural" analysis, federal courts were still
entitled to review the merits of a habeas petition filed by state prisoners, but a state adjudication
would be considered "full and fair" if, among other things, the ultimate disposition was
"reasonable."
70. Liebman, supra note 67, at 413.
71. Id.
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For state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief, AEDPA imposes a
variety of procedural obstacles. State inmates seeking habeas relief must
now consolidate their claims in a single petition, rather than dispersing
their claims through second or successive applications.72 Nor are state
inmates free to file their petitions at any time; AEPDA requires that state
inmates file their petitions within a one-year statute of limitations, starting
in most cases from the date when their conviction becomes "final. 73
AEDPA also requires circuit court judges to issue "certificate[s] of
appealability" before they can consider appeals from denials of habeas
relief entered by district courts.74 With regard to factual findings, AEDPA
all but eliminates the use of evidentiary hearings to develop facts that the
petitioner failed to develop in the state courts-unless "the facts underlying
the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 75
As pernicious as these reforms were, they weren't terribly innovative,
nor did they represent an ideological break from the direction the Court
was headed at the time. It is true that the Court's 1960s habeas
jurisprudence had substantially relaxed the prerequisites for habeas
petitions--opening up the availability of relief for state inmates who would
ordinarily have been denied review altogether-but over the next thirty
years the Court had systematically overturned or abrogated many of those
rulings, evincing a greater respect for finality in the state appellate
process. 76 By the early 1990s, the Court had reinstated or strengthened the
barriers for review that the Warren Court had sharply curtailed. 7  By
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(b) (2006).
73. Id. at § 2244(d).
74. Id. at § 2253(c).
75. Id. at § 2254(e)(2)(B).
76. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (noting the potential of federal
habeas review to undermine the "State's interest in the finality of convictions that have survived
direct review," as well as "frustrate ... the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and...
honor constitutional rights," and needlessly re-litigate petitioners' claims (citing Engle v. Issac,
456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982))).
77. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (overruling Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963), and limiting the circumstances in which habeas petitioners challenging state
convictions are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim that material facts were not
adequately developed in the prior state proceedings); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 487-97
(1991) (overruling in part Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), and requiring dismissal of
successive habeas petitions which fail to raise new or different grounds for relief); Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (overruling in part Sanders, 373 U.S. 1, and holding that
successive habeas petitions may be entertained only where the prisoner supplements the
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
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directly codifying or expanding on these rulings, AEPDA simply finished
what the Supreme Court started.
But in § 2254(d)(1), AEDPA radically departed from some of the
most well-established principles of habeas review. As previously
mentioned, federal courts exercising habeas jurisdiction had long applied
de novo review of "pure" questions of law and mixed questions of law and
fact, regardless of how those questions were adjudicated by the state
court. 78 In the language of § 2254(d)(1), however, federal habeas relief can
only be granted if the state court judgment is "contrary to," or involves an
"unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law. In 1996, the
precise interpretation of these terms was unclear, but they seemed to
obligate federal courts to "defer" to state court interpretations of federal
law.
This suggestion was a controversial one. Even President Clinton,
ostensibly the driving force behind the Act, expressed particular concern
about § 2254(d)(1). In a statement issued when he signed the Act into law,
Clinton acknowledged that AEDPA could potentially "limit the authority of
the Federal courts to bring their own independent judgment to bear on
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact" when exercising
habeas jurisdiction.79 Such a reading, he said, would be subject to
constitutional challenge if it prevented federal courts from making an
"independent determination about 'what the law is"' 80 in accordance with
Marbury's vision of the judicial power. Nonetheless, he expected the
courts to resolve the "ambiguity" so as to preserve their independent
authority to review constitutional claims.8'
Initially, it seemed Clinton's confidence was misplaced. Because
§ 2254(d)(1)'s language was both vague and unprecedented, the circuit
courts adopted wildly divergent interpretations of its meaning, some of
which directly contradicted Marbury. Of critical importance was
identifying how decisions that were "contrary" to federal law differed from
those that "unreasonably" applied such law. With regard to the latter
question, the most extreme interpretation was expressed by the Fourth
Circuit, which held that the phrase "unreasonable application" of federal
U.S. 72, 87-89 (1977) (overruling Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and re-establishing the
procedural default bar on claims not properly raised in prior state proceedings).
78. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 300-06 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
79. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 631 (Apr. 24, 1996).




law obligated near-total deference to the state courts; a state court decision
implicated the "unreasonable" clause only if the state court applied federal
law "in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable. 82
Under this logic, habeas review under § 2254(d)(1) became a rubber stamp
on the state court conviction.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the proper interpretation of
§ 2254(d)(1) in Williams v. Taylor,83 but expressly declined to address its
constitutionality. 84  Justice O'Connor, writing for a shifting majority,85
explained how the new standard of review would be applied.
The first point of the O'Connor opinion was that the "contrary to" and
the "unreasonable application" clauses carried independent meanings.86
According to Justice O'Connor, a state decision is deemed "contrary to"
federal law in one of two circumstances: if the state court arrives at a
conclusion that is opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a
question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the
Court already has on a set of "materially indistinguishable" facts.87 Under
Justice O'Connor's literal definition of the term, "contrary" means that a
federal court can grant habeas relief with regard to questions of law or
mixed questions of law and fact only if the state court decision answers
those questions in a way that is "diametrically different" or "opposite in
character or nature" to existing Supreme Court precedent.88 As Justice
O'Connor observed, such a scenario would be unlikely in the context of a
"run-of-the-mill" case in which the state court identifies the correct legal
standard.89
The "unreasonable application" clause is another matter. According
to Williams, a federal habeas court may grant the writ under this clause if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the
82. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998).
83. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000).
84. Williams v. Taylor, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999) (mem.).
85. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court, and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined his full opinion. Although Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the portion of
the Stevens opinion concluding that the habeas petitioner was entitled to relief, they disagreed
with Stevens' analysis of how to properly interpret the AEDPA standard. As to that issue, Justice
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy,
Thomas and Scalia. Justice Kennedy joined the portion of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the
granting of habeas relief. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion concurring with O'Connor's
interpretation of the AEDPA standard, but dissenting in the grant of habeas, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
86. Id. at 405 (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 406.
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Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner's case.90 O'Connor's interpretation also contemplates a situation
where a state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but
unreasonably extends that principle from existing precedent to a new
context where it should not apply or, alternatively, unreasonably refuses to
extend a legal principle to a new context where it should apply.91
O'Connor left undefined the precise contours of the phrase "unreasonable"
except to say that it was something more egregious than "erroneous," and
that "unreasonableness" was to be defined objectively, rather than
subjectively.92
The approach articulated by Williams lies between two extremes. On
the one hand, Justice O'Connor's reading of the "unreasonable application"
standard was not as severe as the Fourth Circuit's "all reasonable jurists"
standard, an interpretation Justice O'Connor characterized as imposing an
additional gloss on the phrase "unreasonable. 93 On the other hand, the
O'Connor majority rejected the extremely lenient interpretation represented
by Justice Stevens in his concurrence, which argued that the entirety of
§ 2254(d)(1) did not establish a rigid body of rules but rather a "mood" 94
that the federal courts were obliged to respect when reviewing state court
adjudications-an interpretation that Justice O'Connor said gave the
amendment "no effect whatsoever.
95
Under Justice O'Connor's middle ground approach, a federal court
reviewing a habeas action by a state prisoner cannot grant the petition
under the "unreasonable application" clause merely because the state court
deprived the inmate of his constitutional rights. Instead, the federal court is
required to leave undisturbed "reasonable" but erroneous state court
decisions. In identifying the relevant legal principles, a federal court is
restricted to what the statute calls "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,, 96 which Justice
O'Connor deemed to constitute a highly restrictive choice of law provision.
In one of the most quoted passages from Williams, Justice O'Connor
helpfully concluded that "clearly established" federal law consists of "the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of
90. Id. at 413.
91. Id. at 408.
92. Id. at 409-10.
93. Id. at 409.
94. Id. at 386 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
95. Id. at 403 (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).
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the relevant state-court decision. 97 The implications of this have become
clearer over time: a state court decision may not be overturned on habeas
review simply because of a conflict with principles propounded by the
federal circuit courts. Instead, § 2254(d)(1) expressly forecloses reliance
on anything other than existing Supreme Court precedent.98
Subsequent cases have largely confirmed the principles articulated in
Williams: a federal court no longer reviews the legal claims presented by
the petition starting from scratch. Rather, the court applies a more limited
review of how those claims were treated in the state court decision.99 Even
if the petitioner can successfully identify a constitutional error, he must
also show that the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a
decision outrageous enough under Supreme Court precedent to justify
habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1). 100
IV. The Dominant Constitutional Critiques of AEDPA
It is both surprising and slightly cruel that none of the opinions in
Williams directly confronted the constitutionality of the AEDPA revisions,
given that between 1996 and 2000 an intriguing body of scholarly opinion
had emerged that § 2254(d)(1) unconstitutionally restricted the exercise of
the federal courts' powers under the Supremacy Clause and Article III.
Professors James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan expressed the most
notable of these attacks in a 1998 law review article.1 °1 Surveying the
history and painstaking compromises that were negotiated during the
Constitutional Convention, the authors concluded that the Supremacy
Clause and Article III were premised on several fundamental principles
designed to ensure that federal law remained supreme over contrary
97. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
98. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653-55 (2006) (holding that, in the absence of
decisions from the Court regarding the precise issue in question, the federal circuit court
improperly relied on its own precedent to identify clearly established federal law under
§ 2254(d)(1)).
99. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (invalidating Ninth Circuit rule
requiring federal habeas courts to first review legal claims de novo before applying AEDPA
standard of review); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that under the
unreasonable application clause, the focus is on whether the state court's application of clearly
established federal law is objectively unreasonable (citing Williams, 529 U.S at 409-10)).
100. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75 (holding that a federal habeas court must be left with more
than just a firm conviction that the state court is erroneous in its application of federal law to
justify granting relief); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that
relief not warranted where a federal habeas court independently concludes that the state-court
decision applied federal law incorrectly, because the decision must also be objectively
unreasonable).
101. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15.
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legislative and decisional law-a goal seemingly at odds with the language
contained in § 2254(d)(1).' °2 First, Article III confers upon Congress the
power to regulate the federal judiciary's jurisdiction over federal
questions. 10 3 However, once that jurisdiction is granted, the Supremacy
Clause compels the federal courts to exercise what Liebman and Ryan
identify as the five crucial qualities of the judicial power: "[To] decide (1)
the whole federal question (2) independently and (3) finally, based on (4)
the whole supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the process of
binding the parties to the court's judgment, effectuates supreme law and
neutralizes contrary law.
104
As Chief Justice Marshall eloquently illustrated in Marbury, the
judicial power in Article III requires that the judicial branch not just
exercise its independent judgment in deciding cases, but to invalidate and
nullify those laws and decisions which are repugnant to the "supreme law
of the land."'' 0 5 This means that once the federal courts have been granted
jurisdiction to decide a case, Congress may not forbid them from exercising
the power to effectuate their independent judgments and make them
binding on the parties. While Congress has control over the quantitative
boundaries of jurisdiction, the judicial power of federal courts inheres in
their qualitative exercise of that power. 10 6 Crucially, that qualitative power
is beyond the reach of congressional interference. 107
Beyond Marbury, the qualitative/quantitative distinction is bolstered
by other Supreme Court cases in which the Court similarly invalidated acts
of Congress that seemed to infringe on the Court's qualitative power to
independently decide, and give effect to, questions of federal law. For
purposes of this discussion, two cases stand out. In United States v.
Klein,'0 8 the Court struck down a Reconstruction-era law 0 9 designed to
102. In particular, Liebman and Ryan identify constitutional weaknesses with the
interpretations of § 2254(d)(1) that were then being applied by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits. The common feature of these standards was that they called for heightened deference to
state court findings regarding mixed questions of law and fact, which were presumed to fall under
the "unreasonable application" clause. See id. at 864-87.
103. Id. at 884.
104. Id. at 696.
105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
106. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 15, at 772.
107. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) ("[T]he attributes which
inhere in [the judicial] power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative.").
108. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).




nullify a prior Supreme Court ruling 10 that had entitled former Confederate
sympathizers who had obtained presidential pardons the right to sue for
compensation for property seized by the Union Army during the Civil
War.111 The law directed federal courts to treat such pardons as conclusive
proof that the plaintiff had aided the rebellion, and thereupon dismiss the
claim. 112 Furthermore, if the plaintiff had already received a favorable
ruling in the Court of Claims (as Klein did), the law deprived the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction and required that it dismiss the suit in its
entirety. 113 The Court found that the law's "rules of decision" violated the
Constitution in two ways, by dictating how the court should decide an issue
of fact and by denying effect to a presidential pardon.1 14 With respect to
the former, the Court observed that:
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by
dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way? ... Congress has
inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from
the judicial power.115
The law at issue in Klein not only robbed federal courts of the power to
hear a category of cases, but it required that they assign a meaning to a
factual question that was the exact opposite of what the Court would have
ruled under its independent authority. While Congress can and has
imposed rules of decision on federal courts in other contexts, the principal
offense Congress committed was imposing rules of decision on the federal
courts as a means to a particular end. 16
In the 1997 decision City of Boerne v. Flores,1 17 the Court likewise
invalidated an Act of Congress that had attempted to engineer a particular
judicial outcome-in that case, by dictating the standards by which federal
courts should evaluate challenges brought against state and local
governments" 18 under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.1 9 The
110. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
111. Klein, 80 U.S. at 143-44.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 146.
115. Id. at 146-47.
116. Id. at 145.
117. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
118. Id. at512-14.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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Court had previously held in Employment Division v. Smith 120 that neutral,
generally applicable governmental regulations that "substantially
burdened" a religious practice did not need to be supported by a
"compelling" governmental interest to survive scrutiny under the Free
Exercise clause.1 2' Smith overturned several decades of precedent1 22 that
had held otherwise, and Congress responded by passing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),123 which, among other things, attempted
to "restore" the compelling-interest test for religious-practice claims
brought under the Free Exercise clause.
But Boerne held that the RFRA infringed on Separation of Powers
principles because it attempted to re-write the Constitution by forbidding
the courts from giving effect to Supreme Court precedent.124 The Court
reiterated the maxim derived from Marbury that the "power to interpret the
Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.' 25 The
Court also found that the RFRA as it applied to state and local governments
exceeded Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the Amendment's
provisions.1 26 Boerne held that while Congress had the power to remedy
past discrimination and prevent future discrimination, such remedial
legislation had to bear "congruence and proportionality" between "the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.' 27
Allowing the legislature to dictate the substance of a constitutional freedom
was more than remedial-it endowed Congress with the virtually limitless
power to "amend" the Constitution as it saw fit. 1
28
It is worth noting that AEDPA is not nearly as aggressive as either of
these laws. Unlike the law at issue in Klein, it does not impinge on
executive powers, nor does it explicitly instruct Courts how to dispose of a
case. Additionally, AEDPA applies generally across all constitutional
questions, rather than a particular species of constitutional questions as the
120. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
121. Id. at883-87.
122. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
123. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated
by Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
124. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
125. Id. at 524.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
127. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.




RFRA did. Furthermore, because AEDPA was enacted pursuant to
Congress's Article I powers, it does not need to be congruent and
proportional to any perceived injury.129  But perhaps the most obvious
distinction between these laws and § 2254(d)(1) (and perhaps the reason
why the Williams court demurred on its constitutional status) is that
§ 2254(d)(1) is not styled as a qualitative restriction on the powers of
judicial review, but rather on the judicial remedy. 130
The distinction may seem trivial, but in practice it means that
§ 2254(d)(1) preserves the right of federal courts to apply their own
independent judgment to questions of federal law. 131  Instead, the statute
"merely" redefines the circumstances in which the federal courts can grant
a remedy to those constitutional errors that they independently identify.
Accepting for a moment this formalistic interpretation of AEDPA as a
remedial limitation, and comparing it with the five attributes of the judicial
power identified by Liebman and Ryan, it seems that only one such
quality-the power to effectuate federal court judgments by issuing binding
judgments-is really threatened. 132
That is not to imply that a remedial limitation is less constitutionally
problematic than the kinds of qualitative restrictions on the judicial power
invalidated in Boerne and Klein. Rights without remedies cannot fairly be
called rights at all, and the power of federal courts is "not merely to rule on
cases, but to decide them."'' 33 Moreover, if federal courts lack the power to
issue an appropriate remedy, then erroneous state decisional law is allowed
to stand-a deeply troubling prospect that has the potential to "corrupt and
trivialize" 134 the judicial power.
129. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003) (holding that the Boerne standard
"does not hold sway for judicial review of legislation enacted... pursuant to Article I
authorization").
130. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 872 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Congress has ample
power to adjust the circumstances under which the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is
deployed."), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
131. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice has adopted this reasoning to defend
AEDPA from constitutional attack. See Brief for United States as Intervenor at 4, Irons v. Carey,
479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15275) ("Section 2254(d)(1) does not constitute an
impermissible intrusion on federal courts' authority to interpret the governing law and to decide
cases; rather, the statute represents a proper exercise of Congress's authority to define the scope
of the federal habeas remedy for state prisoners.").
132. See 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 55, § 32.5, at 1656-76 (discussing the
"effectualness ingredient" commensurate with the judicial power and how it is limited under
AEDPA).
133. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514U.S. 211,218-19(1995).
134. Motion of Marvin E. Frankel et. al for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae and Brief In
Support of Petitioner at 16, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (No. 98-8384).
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The problem is that these are abstract arguments, and while
§ 2254(d)(1)'s remedial restriction is theoretically just as repugnant and
offensive to the judicial power as a restriction that works by limiting the
interpretative abilities of Article III Courts, the actual harm inflicted is
harder to gauge. That is because § 2254(d)(1) will decide the outcome in
only a slim number of cases, where the state court ruling incorrectly
applied "clearly established" federal law but did so in a way that was not
objectively unreasonable or contrary to that law. In those instances where
the Court has reversed grants of habeas relief on the grounds that the state
court's misapplication of clearly established precedent failed to rise to the
level of being "unreasonable,"'1 35 it has been almost impossible to
determine whether the petitioner would have been granted relief even under
the pre-AEDPA standards of review.1 36 Time will only tell whether the
Court will ever be presented with a wrenching close-call scenario that casts
the rigidity and fundamental unfairness of the § 2254(d)(1) standard into
sharp relief.
Similar practical concerns attend to the argument that § 2254(d)(1)
unconstitutionally inhibits the judicial power by prescribing the sources of
law federal courts must use in evaluating habeas petitions. This argument
rests on the premise that, by requiring federal courts to rely on "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States," the entire body of circuit court rulings that would otherwise be
brought to bear on a given federal question is robbed of its binding
precedential effect. 137 And yet, the § 2254(d)(1) choice of law provision is
supported by more than a kernel of common sense, since circuit court
rulings are generally considered not to be binding on state courts.
138
135. See Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005);
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (per curiam);
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003);
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
136. Where the Court has found relief under § 2254(d)(1) to have been improvidently
granted, the Court has not indicated whether, but for the statute, relief would have been granted
under pre-AEDPA governing standards. The task is identifying a state court decision that (1)
decided a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact which was (2) erroneous under
Supreme Court and/or circuit-based precedent but (3) fails to rise to the level of being
"unreasonable" or "contrary to" existing Supreme Court precedent. See 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ,
supra note 55, § 32.5, at 1676.
137. See Brief of Amici Curiae Habeas Corpus Resource Center et al. in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 17, at 16-20.
138. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor
any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give
way to... [an inferior] federal court's interpretation."); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482
n.3 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that a lower federal court decision is not accorded
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Therefore, the requirement that federal courts apply only Supreme Court
precedent when exercising habeas jurisdiction seems to conform to a
national judicial structure in which state courts are presumed to be
coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal
law. For that reason, circuit court precedent should arguably never be the
sole basis for disrupting the state appellate process or overturning a state
conviction.
In summary, the conventional constitutional critiques of AEDPA have
focused largely on readings of the Supremacy Clause and Article III. So
far, however, factually distinguishable precedent and a nebulous yet
persistent harm that evades easy detection have stymied these assaults.
Moreover, if there is a single defining weakness to § 2254(d)(1), it is its
casual disregard of the constraints placed on Congress's powers with
regard to the writ that are clearly expressed in the Suspension Clause.
V. Why the Suspension Clause Matters
Section 2254(d)(1) has rendered the "very broad limits' ' 139 established
by the Suspension Clause rather quaint: rather than strip jurisdiction
entirely, Congress has simply limited the class of cases in which the federal
courts can grant the habeas remedy. Superficially at least, this would seem
to conform to Marshall's analysis in Bollman, which expressly gave
Congress the power to confer habeas jurisdiction to Article III Courts. But
Bollman is just as important for what it does not say as for what it does.
Marshall's opinion in Bollman does not stand for the proposition that
Congress is entitled to define the meaning of the habeas remedy, or the
manner in which habeas jurisdiction is exercised. On the contrary, Bollman
stands only for the narrow rule that the authorization of jurisdiction-and
authorization alone-lies within the sphere of Congress's powers. Section
2254(d)(1) transgresses that boundary because it instructs federal courts to
give force and effect to constitutional errors that they would otherwise
invalidate-indeed, it "strike[s] at the center of the judge's process of
reasoning"°40-and unnaturally disturbs the federal courts "in the "exercise
of their functions."'
' 41
the stare decisis effect in state court that it would have in a subsequent proceeding within the
same federal jurisdiction); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[O]nly the
Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts ...."); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856,
869-72 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("State courts must knuckle under to decisions of the Supreme
Court, but not of this court."), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
139. Schlup v. Delo 513 U.S. 298, 343 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring).
141. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807).
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The rigidity of the distinction that Bollman draws between what
Congress can or can't do may be subject to dispute, but Bollman might also
be read as pointing to the Suspension Clause as an additional, specific
prohibition on Congress's power to interfere with the federal courts'
independent adjudication of habeas petitions. In other words, the
Suspension Clause does not just state that Congress can restrict the writ in
times of invasion or rebellion: it presumes that Congress can only suspend
the writ, nothing more.
The historical evidence supports this reading. It is important to
understand that, before the establishment of the Bill of Rights, habeas
corpus was considered by the Framers to be the primary vehicle for the
vindication of personal liberty. The Framers were keenly aware of
Blackstone's characterization of the Great Writ earlier in the eighteenth
century as the "Bulwark of the British Constitution," "efficacious... in all
manner of illegal confinement."' 142 In the Federalist No. 84, Alexander
Hamilton invoked the Suspension Clause, and Blackstone's description of
the writ, to justify omitting a Bill of Rights: "Arbitrary imprisonments,"
Hamilton wrote, "have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable
instrument of tyranny."
143
There were other reasons to believe that the Constitution simply didn't
need a Bill of Rights. After all, those powers not explicitly granted to the
federal government were withheld from it; as James Madison put it in a
letter to Thomas Jefferson, "the rights in question are reserved by the
manner in which the federal powers are granted." 144  The sentiment
Hamilton expressed in the Federalist 84 is typical: "Why declare,"
Hamilton asked, "that things shall not be done which there is no power to
do?"'145  Why, for instance, should liberty of the press be expressly
safeguarded from government infringement, when no power was given to
the government by which such restrictions could be imposed? 146  By
contrast, there was the risk that "a positive declaration of some of the most
essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude., 147  The
doctrine of delegated powers was conceived as a safeguard to prevent the
risk of such overreaching by the federal government, to ensure that the
142. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 129 (6th ed. 1775).
143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
144. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 269, 271-74 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904), in WILLIAM COHEN, JONATHAN D.
VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 20 (12th ed. 2005).
145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 143, at 513.
146. Id.
147. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 144, at 271.
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restraints on government power did not create the incentive to interpret its
powers more broadly. Still, James Madison wrote, "[m]y own opinion has
always been in favor of a bill of rights; providing it be so framed as not to
imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration .... ,148
Because it was phrased as a restraint on government power, many of
the same structural arguments made against the Bill of Rights were levied
against the Suspension Clause. Moreover, because the writ of habeas
corpus was conceived as encapsulating the individual liberties that were
eventually encoded in the Bill of Rights, any provision that expressly
allowed for its suspension was greeted with skepticism and concern. Why
should Congress be expressly prohibited from suspending the writ when
that power was not otherwise granted in the remaining body of the text?
During the Constitutional Convention, John Smilie raised this very point
with regard to the Suspension Clause and the Sixth Amendment's
preservation of the right to a jury trial: "How indeed does this agree with
the maxim that whatever is not given is reserved? Does it not rather appear
from the reservation of these two articles that everything else, which is not
specified, is included in the powers delegated to the government?"'
' 49
Professor Freedman points out that the Federalists won this debate by
claiming that the Suspension Clause, despite its negative phrasing, was
actually a grant of government power, and thus did not violate the principle
that those powers not granted to the federal government were withheld
from it. 150 The Suspension Clause allowed Congress the power to cease the
execution of the writ-but that power was reserved only for those periods
in which the public safety required it. Even this limited provision provoked
fear and anxiety among members of the Constitutional Convention, on the
grounds that any such exception would be abused by a tyrannical
legislature. 151 The dispute was resolved by the parties' universal agreement
that the conditions on the writ's suspension were exhaustive, not
illustrative.
Bearing the preceding analysis in mind, we are left with one question:
How could the Suspension Clause, which contemplates that habeas corpus
can only be suspended in times of emergency, leave the Great Writ
glaringly vulnerable to substantive curtailment at the hands of the
legislature of the sort embodied in § 2254(d)(1)? Also, if the Constitution
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. John Smilie, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 392 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saldino eds., 1984), cited in FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 15.
150. FREEDMAN, supra note 26, at 16.
15 1. See id. at 17 (citing various discussions at the Constitutional Convention).
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is read as conferring such power on Congress, the Suspension Clause
becomes redundant. To paraphrase the immortal words of Marbury, if
Congress has the power to exceed the confines of that power conferred on
it in the Constitution, then the careful distribution of this power as
articulated in the Suspension Clause is "form without substance."'
' 52
Indeed, while AEDPA only slightly elevated the gravity of the
constitutional violation required to trigger habeas relief, it has nonetheless
had the effect of suspending the writ fot those cases in which the state court
applied federal law in a manner that was incorrect but not unreasonable.1
53
As discussed in Section III, these kinds of cases are both rare and hard to
pinpoint. But if Congress is free to substantively define the nature of the
habeas remedy, and to do so in a way that suspends the writ for even a
narrow category of cases, there is no logical stopping point that prevents
Congress from employing these means to suspend the writ entirely.
In Williams v. Taylor, Justice O'Connor invalidated the draconian
Fourth Circuit rule that obligated state inmates to establish that their
convictions were premised on an error of federal law that all reasonable
jurists would conclude was unreasonable.154 Phrased differently, it required
that the federal court deny the writ unless it could conclude that no
reasonable jurist would find that the constitutional error was unreasonable.
O'Connor sensibly determined that the Fourth Circuit's gloss on the term
"unreasonable" was itself unreasonable under the rules of statutory
construction, but she did not expressly rule out the possibility that Congress
had the power to redefine the parameters of habeas relief in the kinds of
extreme language embraced by the Fourth Circuit.
55
But if the Great Writ is to have any meaning as a formidable restraint
on tyranny and arbitrary confinement, it must be free from substantive
limitation by the body that most fears it. In Boerne, Justice Kennedy,
speaking for the Court, observed that if Congress had the power to dictate
the substance of a constitutional right through legislation, "no longer would
the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
152. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
153. See Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281, 291 (6th Cir. 2005) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("The
majority's decision achieves the unfortunate trifecta of misapplying the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), gutting the Article III judicial power while
'suspending' the writ of habeas corpus, and stranding a probably innocent inmate in prison for
life.").
154. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-10 (2000).
155. Id.
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means.' It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like
other acts,... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.""
156
Habeas corpus is the quintessential constitutional inquiry, and has
been at least as far back as 1867, when the Court began to recognize that
constitutional error had the potential to void otherwise valid court
judgments. Even after the AEDPA amendments, the federal statute makes
this concept explicit: the ultimate inquiry is whether the prisoner is being
held in custody in violation of "the Constitution or law or treaties of the
United States."'157  Section 2254(d)(1) is hardly constitutional (or even
internally consistent) if it allows prisoners who are in custody in violation
of the Constitution to rot behind bars, simply because Congress has decided
that the Constitution does not speak to them.
158
VI. Conclusion
While the Suspension Clause has been interpreted as merely
illustrative of Congress's powers, the Bollman case, the discussions at the
Constitutional Convention, and the Court's vigorous history in interpreting
the writ strongly suggests that the Suspension Clause should be read as an
exhaustive articulation of Congress's power to manipulate the scope of the
habeas remedy. Under that analysis, AEDPA's qualitative restrictions on
federal habeas review for state prisoners are plainly unconstitutional.
As Professor Zechariah Chafee explained over a century ago, habeas
is "the "most important human right"'159 in the Constitution because it
functions as a mechanism for the enforcement of the Bill of Rights against
the federal government: "Censorship can be evaded; prosecutions against
ideas may break down; a prison wall is there. Only habeas corpus can
penetrate it. When imprisonment is possible without explanation or
redress, every form of liberty is impaired."'
' 60
And yet very little of that analysis emerged during the debates at the
Constitutional Convention. As Chafee notes, "practically all
contemporaneous discussion was directed at the necessity or the danger of
156. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
158. See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 670 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring
specially) ("Whether it was reasonable for a state court to misapprehend the dictates of the
Constitution in a particular case hardly seems relevant to a citizen's right not to be imprisoned in
violation of the fundamental liberties he is granted by the document that governs our societal
structure.").
159. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 53
(1952).
160. Id.
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the permission to suspend the writ in emergencies. The importance of the
writ itself is virtually taken for granted."'' 6 1 The irony is that virtually
nothing about the writ has been taken for granted since.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
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